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The Intoxication Defence: 
Constitutionally Impaired and in 
Need of Rehabilitation 
Gerry Ferguson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The intoxication defence encompasses both voluntary and involun-
tary intoxication. Involuntary intoxication arises relatively infrequently 
as a defence and its rules are less well developed. On the other hand, the 
rules governing voluntary intoxication as a defence have been frequently 
considered and applied, but nevertheless remain in a wholly unsatisfac-
tory state. They are illogical, arbitrary, unprincipled and in various 
respects unconstitutional. In this article, I will briefly examine the rules 
for involuntary intoxication as a defence and suggest that, in part, they 
probably violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 and in 
any event should be amended and included as a new Criminal Code2 
provision. I will then examine the current rules for voluntary intoxication 
as a defence, alluding to their historical development as well as the 
various ways in which they are unsatisfactory. I will also point to three 
areas in which the current rules are, or may be, unconstitutional. 
The first area of Charter concern is in respect to section 33.1 of the 
Criminal Code. Section 33.1 is Parliament’s partial reversal of R. v. 
Daviault3 and it likely violates section 7 of the Charter. In addition, there 
is a strong argument that this violation is not saved under section 1 since 
other constitutionally valid alternatives are available to Parliament to 
achieve the objectives it had in mind in enacting section 33.1. Second, 
the reverse onus imposed in Daviault and continued in section 33.1 is a 
                                                                                                             
* University of Victoria Distinguished Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. I 
would like to thank Professors Benjamin Berger and Christine Boyle for their helpful comments on 
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1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
3 [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Daviault”]. 
112 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
clear violation of the Charter’s section 11(d) guarantee of the presump-
tion of innocence. That reverse onus is illogical and, more importantly, 
unnecessary. The Supreme Court’s conclusion that the section 11(d) 
Charter violation is a reasonable limit under section 1 should be re-
examined in light of the fact that the Supreme Court justified that 
reversal in barely one paragraph of reasoning — hardly a full and fair 
section 1 analysis! Third, there is a gap in the section 33.1 and Daviault 
rules. Those rules do not provide a defence to a person who lacks the 
general mens rea for an offence due to a mistake of fact caused by 
intoxication which is less than extreme intoxication akin to automatism 
or insanity. That gap offends section 7 and is not saved by section 1 of 
the Charter. 
I will conclude this paper by recommending a more logical, more 
fair and constitutionally valid set of intoxication offences which involve 
the creation of new included offences to deal with cases in which 
voluntary intoxication has negated the subjective fault of the offence 
charged. When an accused is acquitted of any subjective fault offence 
because the requisite subjective fault is negated due to voluntary intoxi-
cation, that accused will be automatically convicted of a lesser included 
offence of “unintentionally causing that offence due to criminal intoxica-
tion”. For example, in the case of a charge of sexual assault, such a 
person would be convicted of the new offence of “unintentional sexual 
assault due to criminal intoxication”. 
II. INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
Statistically speaking, it is fair to say that the law’s treatment of in-
voluntarily intoxicated accused persons is not a pressing social concern. 
In the past, cases in which persons have been surreptitiously or otherwise 
involuntarily intoxicated have arisen relatively infrequently, although 
there appears to be a significant increase in surreptitious administration 
of the drug GHB, and other similar “date rape” drugs. But in these and 
other cases, the involuntarily intoxicated person is normally a “victim” 
rather than an offender. Seldom does an involuntarily intoxicated person 
commit an offence while in a state of involuntary intoxication. But in 
those rare cases where that does occur, how does and how ought the law 
to deal with them? The fact that such cases are rare is no justification for 
allowing an incomplete and perhaps unconstitutional law to continue 
unamended. 
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In examining the law of involuntary intoxication, the first issue is to 
determine in what circumstances the law treats intoxication as involun-
tary. If a person, against his or her will, is forced to take or has adminis-
tered to him or her an intoxicant, that person is involuntarily intoxicated. 
Likewise, if an intoxicating substance is surreptitiously inserted into food 
or drink that a person consumes, or is surreptitiously administered to a 
person, that person is also involuntarily intoxicated. However, there is a 
third form of intoxication where the case law is less clear in classifying it 
as voluntary or involuntary. How does the law treat a person who 
voluntarily consumes (or is consensually administered) a drug (e.g., 
medication) without being aware of its intoxicating qualities, or voluntar-
ily consumes a drug, being aware that it has some intoxicating qualities, 
but mistaken about the extent of that drug’s intoxicating effect? In many 
jurisdictions, intoxication which has occurred through no fault of the 
accused will be classified as involuntary intoxication. Conversely, 
intoxication caused by some degree of fault on the part of the accused 
will not be treated as involuntary intoxication.4 In Canada, in R. v. 
Chaulk,5 R. v. Saxon6 and R. v. Abel,7 the appeal courts have held that if a 
person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the substance 
voluntarily consumed was an intoxicant, then a claim of involuntary 
intoxication will fail. Likewise, in R. v. Hardie8 the English Court of 
Appeal held that where self-induced intoxication by medical drugs is 
“faultless” (subjectively and objectively), the person will be treated as 
involuntarily intoxicated. In effect, this principle of faultless intoxication 
seems to have also prevailed in the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. 
King,9 although the stated rationales of both Taschereau and Ritchie JJ. 
for acquittal are somewhat different. In R. v. Allen10 the English Court of 
Appeal held that ignorance or mistake as to the strength of an alcoholic 
                                                                                                             
4 See, however, S. Bronitt & B. McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law, 2d ed. (Pyrmont, 
NSW: Lawbook Co., 2005), at 257, where the authors note that the legislative provisions in some 
Australian jurisdictions indicate that intoxication which results from a “reasonable” mistake will be 
considered involuntary: see s. 428G of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s. 1 of the Criminal Code (NT), 
s. 34 of the Criminal Code (ACT) and s. 8.1 of the Criminal Code (CTH). 
5 [2007] N.S.J. No. 301, 223 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter “Chaulk”]. 
6 [1975] A.J. No. 432, 22 C.C.C. (2d) 370, at 375-76 (Alta. S.C.) [hereinafter “Saxon”]. 
7 [1999] A.J. No. 190, 134 C.C.C. (3d) 155 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Abel”]. 
8 [1985] 1 W.L.R. 64 (C.A.). 
9 [1962] S.C.J. No. 60, [1962] S.C.R. 746 (S.C.C.). In R. v. Penno, [1990] S.C.J. No. 96, 
59 C.C.C. (3d) 344 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court unanimously held that voluntary intoxication is no 
defence to care and control of a motor vehicle, and its exclusion as a defence does not violate the 
Charter. The Court varied in its reasons in reaching that conclusion. In essence, the Court held that 
the mens rea for impaired driving or care and control is voluntary consumption of alcohol. 
10 [1988] Crim. L.R. 698 (C.A.). 
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drink that is voluntarily consumed will not be treated as involuntary 
intoxication. The same result will presumably be reached in Canada on 
the basis that everyone who knows that alcohol or other drugs can have 
an intoxicating effect has subjectively, or at least objectively, taken a risk 
that their impairment may result in their commission of an offence. 
The Canadian rule as articulated in cases such as Chaulk, Saxon and 
Abel is too broadly cast and arguably offends section 7 of the Charter. It 
can be forcefully argued that depriving an accused of the benefits of a 
defence of involuntary intoxication on the basis of an objective standard 
of fault (i.e., “ought to have known”) at least for stigma offences is an 
unconstitutional application of substituted fault.11 And even if this 
substituted fault is not unconstitutional for subjective offences that are 
not classified as stigma offences, the application of an objective fault 
standard to exclude a defence that negates subjective fault or voluntari-
ness is undesirable. Similar to rules governing mistake of fact, where the 
offence charged requires subjective mens rea, an accused should not lose 
the benefit of involuntary intoxication unless he or she knew or was 
subjectively reckless or wilfully blind to the fact that the substance was 
an intoxicant. Being objectively negligent should not suffice unless the 
offence committed is an offence of criminal or penal negligence. 
Once an accused’s intoxication is classified as involuntary, the next 
question is what rules of exculpation apply to an involuntarily intoxi-
cated person. Should the same rules apply to involuntary intoxication as 
apply to voluntary intoxication? If that were the case, there would be no 
need to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary intoxication. But 
there is an essential difference between the two. Involuntary intoxication 
occurs blamelessly, voluntary intoxication does not. That difference 
should be reflected in the rules governing both situations. At a minimum, 
an involuntarily intoxicated person who lacks the intent or the voluntari-
ness for the offence charged, whether specific or general, should be 
acquitted. In other words, the strictures of the specific-general intent rule, 
as modified in Daviault and section 33.1, which apply to cases of 
voluntary intoxication should not apply to cases of involuntary intoxica-
tion. That proposition seems to be recognized in Canadian case law.12 
                                                                                                             
11 R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marti-
neau”]; R. v. Logan, [1990] S.C.J. No. 89, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Finta, [1994] 
S.C.J. No. 26, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (S.C.C.). 
12 In Chaulk, supra, note 5, the trial judge acquitted the accused on three general intent 
assault-related offences on the basis of involuntary intoxication. The Court of Appeal reversed, 
holding that the accused’s intoxication was voluntary. However, the Court did not appear to dispute 
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Likewise, involuntary intoxication can and should be a defence to 
offences of penal or criminal negligence, provided the accused’s state of 
involuntary intoxication did not arise out of negligence on the accused’s 
part.13 
Those two differences from the rules governing voluntary intoxica-
tion arguably do not constitute, by themselves, an adequate and just set 
of rules for involuntary intoxication as a defence. Intoxication normally 
has to be quite high to negate specific or general intent. It is well recog-
nized that milder forms of intoxication do not negate intent, but do 
loosen inhibitions to the extent that a person would not have committed 
the offence but for the intoxication. Those offences could run the gamut 
from a foolish incident of theft or damage to property to a serious assault, 
or perhaps even intentional killing. The law is clear that voluntary 
intoxication that loosens inhibitions but does not negate intent is no 
defence.14 But should a person who was blameless in becoming intoxi-
cated be entitled to claim lessened or diminished control as a defence? 
Although it is controversial, I suggest that they should and that such a 
claim of diminished control due to involuntary (blameless) intoxication 
may be supported under principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of 
the Charter. Such a defence is not entirely unknown. The famous 19th-
century codifier, Thomas Macaulay, who in 1837 prepared a draft 
Criminal Code for the then British colony of India, included a straight-
forward provision which in effect recognized diminished control due to 
involuntary intoxication as a defence.15 Unfortunately, Macaulay’s 
provision was altered beyond recognition when the Indian Penal Code 
was finally enacted in 1860.16 As far as I am aware, no other common-
wealth jurisdiction replicated Macaulay’s diminished control defence for 
involuntary intoxication until the enactment of section 8.5 of the Austra-
                                                                                                             
that if the accused’s intoxication was involuntary he would be entitled to an acquittal on general 
intent offences involving assault. Section 33.1 is expressly restricted to “self-induced” intoxication. 
13 R. v. King, supra, note 9. 
14 D.P.P. v. Beard, [1920] A.C. 479 (H.L.) [hereinafter “Beard”]; R. v. George, [1960] 
S.C.J. No. 53, [1960] S.C.R. 871 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “George”]; R. v. Leary, [1977] S.C.J. No. 39, 
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 29 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Leary”]. 
15 In s. 68 of his draft Code, Macaulay provided that “Nothing is an offence which a person 
does in consequence of being, at the time of doing it, in a state of [involuntary] intoxication.” For a 
full account of Macaulay’s treatment of involuntary intoxication, and the abandonment of it by the 
final drafters of the Indian Penal Code, see G. Ferguson, “Intoxication” [hereinafter “Ferguson, 
‘Intoxication’”] in W.C. Chan, B. Wright & S. Yeo, eds., Codification, Macaulay and the Indian 
Penal Code: The Legacies and Modern Challenges of Criminal Law Reform (Farnham, UK: 
Ashgate, 2011). 
16 Act No. 45 of 1860 (October 6, 1860). 
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lian Commonwealth Criminal Code in 2002.17 That same provision was 
adopted in the Australian Capital Territory Criminal Code Act 200218 and 
subsequently adopted in the Northern Territory Criminal Code Act 
2005.19 A lessened inhibitions standard for involuntary intoxication was 
also adopted by the English Court of Appeal on a charge of indecent 
assault in R. v. Kingston20 under the rubric of a defence of “innocent 
intent”. However, the House of Lords overruled that decision and held 
that there is no defence of innocent intent or lessened inhibitions by 
reason of involuntary intoxication.21 Subsequently, the English Law 
Commission22 and the Tasmania Law Reform Institute23 examined and 
rejected the idea of an involuntary intoxication defence based on less-
ened inhibitions. 
Notwithstanding these rejections of such a defence, I think there is a 
sound moral basis for exculpating such accused persons. It can be argued 
that principles of fundamental justice dictate that persons who would not 
have committed an offence but for the unlawful imposition of intoxica-
tion on them deserve not to be punished even if they intended the offence 
committed. At first glance, it may seem contrary to ordinary principles of 
responsibility to acquit a person of an offence if the person has commit-
ted it with the requisite mental fault element. However, that is precisely 
what the law does in the context of certain other lawful justifications and 
excuses, such as self-defence, necessity or duress. In each of those 
instances, the mental element for the offence committed exists, but the 
accused is excused or justified in committing that offence for sound 
policy reasons. In the case of involuntary intoxication, the accused 
should be entitled to an acquittal because his or her ordinary volitional 
control mechanisms are impaired, through no relevant fault of his or her 
own, to the extent that the accused has committed an offence which he or 
she would not have committed if sober. Under those circumstances, it is 
unfair to hold that person to blame for something which was in effect 
caused through no fault of his or her own. 
                                                                                                             
17 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Act No. 12), s. 8.5, came into force in 2002. See also Tasmania 
Law Reform Institute, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, Final Report No. 7 (2006), at 53-60 
[hereinafter “Tasmania Law Reform Institute”]. 
18 Criminal Code Act 2002 (A2002-51), s. 34. 
19 Criminal Code Amendment (Criminal Responsibility Reform) Act (Act No. 37, 2005). 
20 [1994] 1 Q.B. 81, at 87 (C.A.). 
21 [1995] 2 A.C. 355 (H.L.). The House of Lords held that if such a defence was to be 
created, it was a task for Parliament, not the courts. 
22 Law Commission for England and Wales, Intoxication and Criminal Liability, Report 
No. 314 (UK Cm 7526, 2009), at 86-91 [hereinafter “Intoxication and Criminal Liability”]. 
23 Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17, at 94-102. 
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Critics of the lessened inhibitions concept argue that it is an unwork-
able test because it would be virtually impossible to determine whether 
the accused would not have committed the offence had he or she not 
been involuntarily intoxicated. While this is a legitimate concern, it is not 
insurmountable. Like many other legal tests, it will be easy to infer in 
some cases and difficult to infer in other cases, just as inferences about 
the accused’s fault or state of mind are easy to draw in some cases and 
difficult to draw in other cases. Judges and juries rely on their own 
experience and common sense in drawing such inferences. It may, 
however, require specialized rules regarding the admissibility and use of 
the accused’s prior conduct and character. While it is challenging to craft 
specific evidence rules for certain contexts, as we have seen in regard to 
self-defence (e.g., in regard to the admissibility of evidence concerning 
the complainant’s disposition for violence), battered woman syndrome 
(e.g., specific directions on how a judge or jury should use expert 
evidence in respect to the battered woman syndrome), and rape shield 
evidence laws (e.g., ss. 276-278), it is not impossible. 
A more substantial argument against a lessened inhibitions rule is the 
claim that the accused is still morally blameworthy if he or she intention-
ally or recklessly commits an offence, even though the accused would 
not have committed that offence if sober.24 This claim is often premised 
on the assumption that an involuntarily intoxicated person will become 
aware of his or her intoxication and at that stage has an obligation or 
responsibility to monitor his or her behaviour from that point on. In fact, 
in many cases, involuntarily intoxicated persons may not know they are 
intoxicated.25 Second, even if a person does become aware of his or her 
intoxication, it may be unfair to impose a duty or responsibility on that 
person to “make special efforts to see and avoid risks” when his or her 
blameless state of intoxication has impaired the very qualities — intellec-
tual and moral judgment and ordinary behaviour control mechanisms — 
that are relevant to taking special precautions to avoid commission of a 
crime. 
A third concern with a lessened inhibitions test for involuntary in-
toxication is its potential to be a complete defence to the intentional 
commission of the most serious of offences by persons whose inhibitions 
                                                                                                             
24 Id., at 97. 
25 Some commentators have suggested that the law should treat involuntarily intoxicated 
persons who are unaware that they are intoxicated more leniently than involuntarily intoxicated 
persons who become aware that they are intoxicated. While there may be some merit in that claim, I 
have not adopted it in my proposed draft. 
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are only modestly impaired. For example, suppose A, while in a state of 
involuntary intoxication, intentionally sexually assaults or kills V. An 
acquittal for sexual assault or for murder in such circumstances would 
indeed be a cause for concern in most circumstances. But this sort of 
unlikely hypothetical must be put into context. The lessened inhibition 
defence for involuntary intoxication only applies in circumstances where 
the accused would not have committed the offence but for the involun-
tary intoxication. Involuntary intoxication is rare. Intentionally killing or 
sexually assaulting another person while in such a state would be even 
rarer. If such a claim ever arose, in my view a judge or jury would be 
naturally skeptical and therefore very slow to accept that an intentional 
killing or sexual assault was committed as a consequence of the ac-
cused’s involuntary intoxication, and would not have occurred but for the 
involuntary intoxication. In addition, under my proposal for a lessened 
inhibitions defence of involuntary intoxication, the accused is not entitled 
to rely on involuntary intoxication to a subjective fault offence like 
murder or sexual assault if the accused was subjectively reckless or 
wilfully blind in becoming intoxicated. 
Finally, there may be a slippery slope concern. If lessened inhibitions 
due to blameless intoxication is recognized as an excuse for crime, why 
shouldn’t lessened inhibitions due to blameless circumstances such as 
mental and behavioural disorders, social upbringing, economic circum-
stances, absence of essential social safety nets for those in need, etc., be 
an excuse for crime if the accused would not have committed the crime 
but for his or her blamelessness in regard to the existence of those 
circumstances? This is a fair and legitimate question. A full analysis of it 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but I would make a few brief points. 
First, I suggest that the law needs to step onto slippery slopes where 
fairness and justice demand. The law is quite capable of carefully and 
cautiously taking one step at a time. Second, the law already recognizes 
some instances of impaired or lessened inhibitions, such as some 
incidents of necessity, duress, provocation and entrapment. Third, 
recognition of a discretely contained and infrequently occurring defence 
of lessened inhibitions due to blameless intoxication may have the 
positive effect of opening up a wider debate on the relevance of lessened 
inhibitions to criminal liability. That debate on the extent to which 
current criminal law and its categories for blame “scapegoat” vulnerable 
members of society and thereby consciously and unconsciously reject 
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and hide society’s complicity in the commission of criminal harms is 
long overdue.26 
In light of the above analysis, I propose the enactment of an involun-
tary intoxication defence provision along the following lines: 
(1) No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an act or 
omission committed in consequence of being in a state of involuntary 
intoxication. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, a person is in a state of 
involuntary intoxication in circumstances where the substance which 
intoxicated that person was consumed or administered 
(a) against that person’s will, 
(b) without that person’s knowledge, or 
(c) in ignorance of its intoxicating quality, 
and provided that the compulsion, lack of knowledge or ignorance in 
paragraphs (a) to (c) did not arise from subjective recklessness or wilful 
blindness on the part of that person in the case of subjective fault 
offences, or penal negligence in the case of objective fault offences. 
Under the above proposal, if A commits a subjective fault offence 
(e.g., assault, theft or mischief), while intoxicated by reason of circum-
stance (a), (b) or (c) in subsection (2), A is involuntarily intoxicated and 
is not guilty of that subjective fault offence even if A acted with the 
requisite subjective fault for that offence, provided: (1) A would not have 
committed that offence if A was not so intoxicated; and (2) A was not 
subjectively reckless or wilfully blind in becoming intoxicated by reason 
of circumstances (a) to (c). If A was subjectively reckless in regard to his 
intoxication under circumstance (a) to (c), A is not involuntarily intoxi-
cated and cannot therefore rely on the defence of involuntary intoxica-
tion. In this latter circumstance, A may rely on voluntary intoxication as a 
defence if the requirements for voluntary intoxication have been met. On 
the other hand, if A was objectively but not subjectively reckless in 
becoming intoxicated under circumstances (a) to (c), A can rely on 
involuntary intoxication as a defence to any subjective fault offence, but 
                                                                                                             
26 See, e.g., B. Berger, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in Criminal Law” in 
F. Tanguay-Renaud & J. Stribopoulos, eds., Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian 
Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational and International Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2012) 117. 
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not to an objective fault offence such as causing death or bodily harm by 
criminal negligence or careless use of a firearm by penal negligence. 
Clause (c) of subsection (2) deals with a situation where the accused 
knowingly consumes, or consents to the administration of, a substance 
with no knowledge of its intoxicating properties. This clause draws a 
hard line between no knowledge of a substance’s intoxicating effect and 
mistaken knowledge as to the strength or extent of its intoxicating effect. 
The first scenario is treated as involuntary intoxication. The second 
scenario is treated as voluntary intoxication. 
III. VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
1. The Specific-General Intent Rule 
Accepting voluntary intoxication as a partial or complete defence to 
any crime can be a controversial matter. This controversy is heightened 
by the indisputable fact that a large percentage of crimes, and especially 
crimes of violence, are committed by persons who have voluntarily 
consumed alcohol or drugs.27 There is a strong correlation between 
intoxication and the commission of crime, even if that relationship is not 
purely causal. At the same time, although intoxicated crime is frequent, 
the extent to which intoxication exempts an offender from full or partial 
liability should not be exaggerated. While alcohol and drugs loosen an 
offender’s inhibitions and render the commission of crime more likely, 
that circumstance alone provides no defence.28 There is only a small 
percentage of intoxication cases where the intoxication is so extreme that 
                                                                                                             
27 In Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics, Statistics Canada, 2005), K. Beattie utilizes the 2004 General Social Survey, showing an 
association between alcohol and violence in domestic settings: 44 per cent of women stated that their 
partner had been drinking at the time of violence, and women with partners classified as “heavy 
drinkers” (five or more drinks on one occasion) experienced a greater likelihood of violence than 
women with “moderate” drinking partners. N. Desjardins and T. Mahony revealed in “Trends in 
Drug Offences and the Role of Alcohol and Drugs in Crime”, in Juristat (February 2004), that 
alcohol-dependent inmates were much more likely to have committed a violent crime than were 
drug-dependent inmates. Further, the General Social Survey from 1999 revealed that 51 per cent of 
victims of physical assaults and 45 per cent of victims of sexual assault believed their incident was 
related to the assaulter’s use of alcohol. See also K. Pernanen, Alcohol in Human Violence (New 
York: The Guildford Press, 1991) and Intoxication and Criminal Liability, supra, note 22, at 1-2, 
summarizing data indicating that in 46 per cent of violent incidents, victims believe their offender(s) 
to be under the influence of alcohol; and 20 per cent of the time, under the influence of other drugs. 
See also G. Dingwall, Alcohol and Crime (Devon: William Publishing, 2006), esp. ch. 2. 
28 See, e.g., Beard, supra, note 14. 
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the offender lacks the subjective state of mind required for the offence 
committed.29 It is in this latter category of cases where the law struggles 
to craft an appropriate response. Clearly a person who has committed a 
criminal harm while voluntarily intoxicated is deserving of both con-
demnation and some degree of punishment. The difficulty which arises 
as a matter of logic is the apparent inconsistency in convicting a person 
of an offence requiring a subjective state of mind when it is apparent that 
the person did not have that state of mind due to a high level of voluntary 
intoxication. Over time, the common law and penal codes around the 
world have adopted various approaches in respect to liability for offences 
committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication. The development of 
the specific-general intent rule has been the dominant approach in 
common law countries for two centuries.30 
Prior to 1800, the common law never considered voluntary intoxica-
tion as a defence to crime;31 in fact, it was sometimes considered an 
aggravation.32 The first signs that voluntary drunkenness would be given 
some consideration appeared in the early 19th century.33 In a series of 
cases starting with R. v. Meakin,34 R. v. Cruse,35 and R. v. Monkhouse,36 
the courts held that if intoxication negated the specific or particular intent 
required for the offence charged, there could be no conviction for that 
offence. Although the expression “specific intent” was used in these 
cases, there was no legal rule at this stage which divided intent into 
specific and basic intent crimes. In R. v. Doherty,37 and R. v. Meade,38 the 
                                                                                                             
29 See, e.g., C.N. Mitchell, “The Intoxicated Offender — Refuting the Legal and Medical 
Myths” (1988) 11 Int’l J. of Law & Psychiatry 77, at 91, where the author cites studies indicating 
that intoxicated defendants are rarely unaware of their actions and rarely act without intent. While 
intoxication may make people less concerned about the consequences of their actions, it seldom 
renders them unable to perceive those consequences. 
30 For a more detailed historical account, see G. Ferguson, “Mens Rea Evaluated in Terms 
of the Essential Elements of a Crime, Specific Intent, and Drunkenness” (1971) 4 Ottawa L. Rev. 
356, at 373-78, which relies in part on R.U. Singh, “History of the Defence of Drunkenness in 
English Criminal Law” (1933) 49 Law Q. Rev. 528 (1933) [hereinafter “Singh”]. 
31 Singh, id., at 536. See also Reniger v. Fogossa (1551), 1 Plowdon 2, 75 E.R. 1 (K.B.). 
32 See Beverley’s Case (1603), 4 Coke Rep. 123b, at 125a, 76 E.R. 1118, at 1123 (K.B.). 
33 See Rennie’s Case (1825), 1 Lewin 76, 168 E.R. 965 (Sp. Assizes); Marshall’s Case 
(1830), 1 Lewin 76, 168 E.R. 965 (Sum. Assizes); Pearson’s Case (1835), 2 Lewin 144, 168 E.R. 
1108 (Sp. Assizes); R. v. Thomas (1837), 7 C. & P. 817, 173 E.R. 356 (Oxford Cir. Ct.); but see R. v. 
Carroll (1835), 7 Car. & P. 145, 173 E.R. 64 (Nisi Prius). 
34 (1836), 7 Car. & P. 297, 173 E.R. 131 (Nisi Prius). 
35 (1838), 8 Car. & P. 541, 173 E.R. 610 (Nisi Prius). 
36 (1849), 4 Cox C.C. 55 (Central Crim. Ct.). See also the discussion in A.P. Simester & 
W.J. Brookbanks, Principles of Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Auckland: Thomson, 2007), at 336-37 
[hereinafter “Simester & Brookbanks”]. 
37 (1887), 16 Cox C.C. 306 (Nisi Prius). 
38 [1909] 1 K.B. 895 (Ct. Crim. App.). 
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English courts held that drunkenness as a defence was not restricted to 
specific intent crimes and was available as a defence to any crime 
requiring proof of intent. In 1920, the House of Lords in Beard39 articu-
lated their oft-quoted statement of the intoxication rule in terms of 
specific intent. Later in their judgment, the House of Lords held that 
intoxication was not restricted to specific intent offences and could also 
be used to negate any intentional offence.40 However, that wider rule was 
not followed in subsequent cases. Instead, the intoxication defence in 
England, Canada41 and some Australian jurisdictions became a rigid rule 
that intoxication is only admissible to negate specific intent but not basic 
or general intent. 
The specific-general intent rule which excludes voluntary intoxica-
tion as a defence to general intent crimes has been vigorously defended 
as a just rule that is based on the need to protect the public by punishing 
intoxicated offenders. It is argued that a voluntarily intoxicated offender 
who commits a (general intent) offence is morally blameworthy and 
deserves to be convicted and punished for that offence. For example, in 
the House of Lords’ decision in D.P.P. v. Majewski, Lord Elwyn-Jones 
claimed that the general-specific intent rule is not “unethical or contrary 
to the principles of natural justice”, and he justified the rule that intoxica-
tion is no defence to basic intent offences on the grounds that a person 
who voluntarily “takes a substance which causes him to cast off the 
restraints of reason and conscience, ... in my view supplies the evidence 
of mens rea, of guilty mind certainly sufficient for crimes of basic intent. 
It is a reckless course of conduct and recklessness is enough to constitute 
the necessary mens rea in assault cases”.42 As with other defenders of the 
specific-general intent rule, he gives no real explanation of why these 
same reasons do not exclude intoxication as a defence to specific intent 
offences. 
Notwithstanding the above type of moral defence of the specific-
general intent rule, it has been frequently criticized by courts, academics 
                                                                                                             
39 Supra, note 14. 
40 Id., at 504. 
41 R. v. MacAskill, [1931] S.C.J. No. 3, [1931] S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.); George, supra, note 14; 
and Leary, supra, note 14. 
42 [1977] A.C. 443, at 474-75 [hereinafter “Majewski”]. For a similar rationale, see Lord 
Simon in Majewski, at 479. For another explanation of the moral and legal justification of the 
specific-basic intent rule, see Mason J.’s minority reasons in R. v. O’Connor (1980), 146 C.L.R. 64, 
at 110-11 (H.C.A.) [hereinafter “O’Connor”]. 
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and law reform bodies as unprincipled, illogical and arbitrary. In brief, 
the primary criticisms43 include the following: 
(1) The specific-general intent rule is considered both illogical and 
unprincipled by many judges and commentators. For example, in 
Daviault,44 Cory J., for the majority of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada, held that preventing the admission of evidence of extreme in-
toxication to negate general intent offences is unprincipled and 
contrary to principles of fundamental justice because it substitutes 
the intent or recklessness to get drunk for the intent or recklessness 
required to commit sexual assault in circumstances where the for-
mer is in no way morally equivalent to the latter.45 
(2) The distinction between specific and general intent offences is 
premised on linguistic manipulation of the definition or description 
of an offence, not on any morally significant differences between 
specific and general intent offences.46 
(3) It is difficult in some cases to articulate and apply the distinction 
between specific and general intent offences.47 This difficulty leads 
to arbitrary and inconsistent results from court to court, offence to 
offence and jurisdiction to jurisdiction.48 
(4) The specific-general intent rule is an inadequate compromise 
solution. Intoxication as a defence to specific intent offences has 
been accepted by common law courts as an imperfect but tolerable 
rule because it mostly arises in the specific intent offence of murder 
and offenders who lack the intent for murder due to intoxication, are 
still convicted of a serious, lesser included offence of manslaughter, 
                                                                                                             
43 For a more detailed critique of the specific-general intent rule, see T. Quigley, “Specific 
and General Nonsense?” (1987) 11 Dal. L.J. 75. Likewise, Dickson J., dissenting in Leary, supra, 
note 14, gives a cogent and convincing critique of the specific-general intent rule. 
44 Supra, note 3. 
45 Id., at paras. 39-42. 
46 See, e.g., O’Connor, supra, note 42, at 104. For example, in Canada, sexual offences in 
ss. 271-273 of the Criminal Code are general intent offences and sexual offences against children 
and young persons in ss. 151-153 are specific intent offences. Since intoxication is not a defence to 
the former, what moral justification is there for it being a defence to the latter? 
47 The definition of specific-general intent in George, supra, note 14, per Fautaux J., was 
adopted in Majewski, supra, note 42. In R. v. Heard, [2008] Q.B. 43 (C.A.) [hereinafter “Heard”], 
the Court interpreted the Majewski specific-basic intent distinction, which they acknowledged was 
elusive, as indicating that a specific intent offence requires “proof of a state of mind addressing 
something beyond the prohibited act itself, namely its consequences”. 
48 The commonly repeated distinction that specific intent offences require a mens rea which 
goes beyond the immediate actus reus — i.e., an ulterior intent — fails to explain why murder is 
consistently classified as specific intent although it requires no ulterior intent. And the offence of 
rape has also been difficult to classify. 
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with a very wide sentencing range. But some specific intent of-
fences do not contain lesser included general intent offences, and 
therefore the intoxicated offender escapes conviction and punish-
ment for any offence. For example, a thief who lacks the necessary 
specific intent for theft will be acquitted entirely, with no alternative 
conviction available.49 There is no moral justification for absolving 
the intoxicated thief entirely. 
Despite these criticisms, the specific-general intent rule continues to 
be the law in England,50 in Tasmania51 and, in a modified way, under the 
Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code Act, 1995,52 the Australian 
Capital Territory Criminal Code Act, 2002,53 the New South Wales 
Crimes Act, as amended in 1996,54 and in South Australia as amended in 
2004.55 And in Canada, the specific-general intent rule still applies 
although it has been significantly modified by Daviault and section 33.1 
of the Criminal Code. 
2. Leary and Pre-Charter Attempts to Alter the Specific-General 
Intent Rule 
The serious deficiencies in respect to the specific-general intent rule 
led the majority of the Australian High Court in O’Connor56 to abolish 
                                                                                                             
49 Theft has been classified as a specific intent crime: see, e.g., Ruse v. Read, [1949] 1 K.B. 
377, approved in Majewski, supra, note 42; and George, supra, note 14. 
50 See Majewski, id., and Heard, supra, note 47. 
51 Criminal Code Act, 1924 (Tas.), s. 17. 
52 Criminal Code Act, 1995 (Cth.), ss. 8.1-8.4, which provide that self-induced intoxication 
cannot be used to negate basic intent, but restrict basic intent to intention to commit the prescribed 
act or omission, but not intention in respect to requisite circumstances or results. 
53 Criminal Code, 2002 (ACT), ss. 30-31 and 33. See Intoxication and Criminal Liability, 
supra, note 22, at 126-27, where the relevant provisions in the Commonwealth and ACT Codes are 
summarized. 
54 Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 1996, Part 11A, which is summarized in Tasmania 
Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17, at 57. 
55 Criminal Law Consolidation (Intoxication) Amendment Act, 2004 (S.A.), s. 268. The new 
sections are summarized in Tasmania Law Reform Institute, id., at 58-60. Under these provisions, 
South Australia abolished the broad common law O’Connor rules in 2004, and reverted to a 
narrower specific-basic intent rule whereby a presumption is created that an accused possesses the 
necessary mental element in the act requirement of basic intent offences. However, where offences 
require proof that the accused foresaw particular consequences or was aware of particular 
circumstances, voluntary intoxication is admissible to rebut the existence of that foresight or 
awareness. 
56 Supra, note 42. As noted below, a similar attempt to abolish the specific-general intent 
rule in favour of a negation of subjective fault rule was rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court 
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the common law rule of specific-basic intent and replace it with a rule 
that evidence of intoxication may be used to negate any subjective 
mental element, including voluntariness, intention, knowledge or 
subjective recklessness. A similar approach was taken by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in R. v. Kamipeli57 five years earlier. The rule in 
Kamipeli was also examined and endorsed as the most appropriate 
intoxication rule by the New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee 
in 1984.58 One of the major concerns about the Kamipeli and O’Connor 
rule is the fear that it will result in a flood of acquittals and/or an increase 
in crime. However, studies have indicated that this fear has not material-
ized.59 It takes a very high level of intoxication to negate a basic intent, 
and therefore it is not surprising that it seldom occurs, although it can 
still be argued that even one such acquittal may be one too many.60 
Two years before O’Connor, the Supreme Court of Canada was 
asked to reconsider the rule that voluntary intoxication is no defence to a 
general intent offence. In Leary,61 the accused was convicted of rape. The 
complainant testified it was a case of non-consensual, forced intercourse. 
The accused argued that it was consensual. There was some evidence of 
intoxication. The trial judge told the jury, “drunkenness is no defence in a 
charge of this sort”. The Court of Appeal agreed: rape is a general intent 
offence and therefore intoxication is no defence. A majority (6-3) of the 
Supreme Court dismissed the accused’s appeal on the same grounds. 
Justice Pigeon, for the majority, relied heavily on the unanimous decision 
of the House of Lords in Majewski. In that case, the House of Lords 
unanimously upheld the specific-basic intent rule. Justice Pigeon, for 
                                                                                                             
of Canada in Leary, supra, note 14, and rejected again by a majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. 
Bernard, [1988] S.C.J. No. 96, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bernard”]. 
57 [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 610, at 614 (C.A.). See discussion of Kamipeli in Simester & Brook-
banks, supra, note 36, at 341-51. 
58 New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee, Report on Intoxication as a Defence to a 
Criminal Charge (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 1984). 
59 See Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17, at 81, where the Report refers to 
some of these studies. See also M. Drassinower & D. Stuart, “Nine months of Judicial Application of 
the Daviault Defence” (1995) 39 C.R. (4th) 280, where the authors found, out of thousands of 
intoxicated offenders, only 20 cases of Daviault intoxication, only three of which succeeded. 
60 The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Daviault, supra, note 3, was met with a 
barrage of public outrage and resulted in the Canadian Parliament quickly reversing part of Daviault. 
A similar outrage occurred in South Australia in regard to the acquittal of a Mr. Nodruku, and that 
acquittal sparked legislative reform in South Australia: see Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, 
note 17, at 82. And the 1985 U.K. Law Commission Final Report, Intoxication and Criminal 
Responsibility, rejected the O’Connor rule based on the same concern about acquittals of drunken 
accused leading to public outrage and loss of faith in the justice system: Tasmania Law Reform 
Institute, id., at 83. 
61 Supra, note 14, affg [1975] B.C.J. No. 1051, 26 C.C.C. (2d) 522 (B.C.C.A.). 
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example, expressly relied on Lord Elwyn-Jones’ justification for the rule, 
quoted above. On the other hand, Dickson J., dissenting, vigorously and 
persuasively set out the criticisms of the specific-general intent rule that I 
have summarized above. He then concluded that the specific-general 
intent distinction should be abandoned and that evidence of intoxication 
should be admissible in determining whether specific or general mens 
rea for the offence charged did in fact exist. He challenged the claim that 
the general intent rule protects the public from violence. He also empha-
sized the importance of subjective mens rea in respect to the offence 
committed, and rejected the argument that the fault in becoming intoxi-
cated can be necessarily equated to the subjective recklessness that is 
required for the offence committed, such as rape. Finally, he acknowl-
edged that Parliament could, if it wished, create a separate offence of 
drunk and dangerous.62 
Although the abolition rule adopted in O’Connor and Kamipeli and 
advocated by Dickson J. dissenting in Leary has several advantages, it 
has one fatal disadvantage. In terms of advantages: (1) it adheres to 
fundamental principles of responsibility by preventing conviction of a 
person for a crime in circumstances where the requisite volition or 
subjective fault element for that crime are not present; (2) it is logical 
and straightforward in its application of the principles of responsibility; 
and (3) it has not, as some feared, resulted in a spate of acquittals or an 
increase in intoxicated crime. But the fatal disadvantage of the O’Connor 
rule is the fact that it results in the total acquittal of some intoxicated 
offenders. Except in the rarest of circumstances,63 an outright acquittal is 
not morally warranted where a person has voluntarily become intoxi-
cated and thereby taken a risk of committing some offence, and in that 
state has in fact committed an offence. Furthermore, such acquittals lead 
to public disillusionment in the justice system.64 In my view, abolition of 
the specific-general intent rule, without the creation of a legislative 
replacement, is socially and morally an unacceptable option.65 
                                                                                                             
62 See id., at paras. 61-68 (S.C.C.). 
63 The very rare case of a first-time drinker who was unaware of the intoxicating effects of 
alcohol or other drugs may provide an example of a case where a conviction and criminal sanction 
are not morally justified. This situation would be akin to mistake of fact. 
64 See discussion of this point in note 60 above. 
65 Surprisingly, in spite of the above criticism, the Tasmania Law Reform Institute in its 
Report, supra, note 17, has recommended the adoption of the O’Connor rule as the best intoxication 
option, and has rejected adding to it a new lesser included offence of criminal intoxication for 
persons who are acquitted of the crime charged due to intoxication. 
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3. The Specific-General Intent Rule after the Charter 
In Bernard,66 the accused was convicted of sexual assault causing 
bodily harm. He admitted that he forced the complainant to have inter-
course, but he claimed that due to intoxication he did not know what he 
was doing and that when he did realize what he was doing, he stopped. 
The trial judge directed the jury that drunkenness was no defence to the 
charge. The Court of Appeal agreed. The Supreme Court was then asked 
to reconsider the Leary rule. Justice McIntyre (with Beetz J. concurring) 
upheld the Leary rule, arguing that it was not artificial, illogical or 
lacking in rational justification. Following the reasoning in Majewski, he 
held that voluntarily getting so drunk as to lose control and cause 
criminal harm is reckless behaviour and that recklessness is an adequate 
mens rea for general intent offences such as assault and sexual assault. 
He also concluded, somewhat briefly, that this form of substituted fault 
does not offend section 7 or section 11(d) of the Charter. 
Justice Wilson (with L’Heureux-Dubé J. concurring) held that with-
holding evidence of intoxication from the jury is appropriate in most 
general intent offences because, except in cases of extreme intoxication, 
evidence of intoxication is not capable of “raising a reasonable doubt as 
to the existence of the minimal intent required for the offence”.67 Second, 
Wilson J. disagreed with McIntyre J. and held that it is not necessary to 
resort to the proposition that the mens rea in getting voluntarily intoxi-
cated is an adequate mens rea for the subjective fault offence that was 
committed, for example, sexual assault. She expressed her tentative view 
on the basis of R. v. Vaillancourt68 and R. v. Whyte69 that McIntyre J.’s 
“substituted mens rea” principle violated the presumption of innocence 
in section 11(d) of the Charter and was not saved by section 1 of the 
Charter. Justice Wilson upheld the specific-general intent rule but made 
one significant modification, namely, evidence of extreme intoxication 
involving an absence of awareness akin to automatism or insanity is 
admissible to negate general intent. She argued that it is only in cases of 
extreme intoxication that the evidence of intoxication is strong enough to 
raise a reasonable doubt that the accused had the minimal general intent 
for the offence charged. In that regard, Wilson J. stated: 
                                                                                                             
66 Supra, note 56. See also R. v. Quin, [1988] S.C.J. No. 99, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.), 
where the Supreme Court justices each followed the reasoning that they had set out in Bernard. 
67 Bernard, id., at para. 90. 
68 [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). 
69 [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
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... The decision of the House of Lords in D.P.P. v. Majewski ... may 
stand for the rather harsh proposition that even self-induced 
intoxication producing a state of automatism cannot constitute a 
defence to an offence of general intent such as assault but I doubt that 
our Canadian jurisprudence goes that far. 
... 
I believe that the Leary rule is perfectly consistent with an onus 
resting on the Crown to prove the minimal intent which should 
accompany the doing of the prohibited act in general intent offences. I 
view it as preferable to preserve the Leary rule in its more flexible form 
as Pigeon J. applied it, i.e., so as to allow evidence of intoxication to go 
to the trier of fact in general intent offences only if it is evidence of 
extreme intoxication involving an absence of awareness akin to a state 
of insanity or automatism. Only in such a case is the evidence capable 
of raising a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the minimal intent 
required for the offence. I would not overrule Leary, as the Chief 
Justice would, and allow evidence of intoxication to go to the trier of 
fact in every case regardless of its possible relevance to the issue of the 
existence of the minimal intent required for the offence. 
It was argued by the appellant and indeed accepted by the Chief 
Justice in his reasons that the Leary rule converts the offence of sexual 
assault causing bodily harm into a crime of absolute liability in that the 
Crown need not prove any mental element. This is said to offend 
section 7 of the Charter as interpreted in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act ... 
and in R. v. Vaillancourt ... . With all due respect to those who think 
differently I do not believe that the Crown is relieved from proving the 
existence of the required minimal intent by the operation of Leary.70 
Chief Justice Dickson (with Lamer J. concurring and La Forest J. 
concurring on the law, but not the result) argued that the specific-general 
intent Leary rule should be abandoned for the same reasons he expressed 
in dissent in the Leary case. Second, he held that the Leary rule violated 
sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and was not saved by section 1. In 
particular, he held that the general intent rule imposes a form of absolute 
liability that violates the Charter. He also argued that the general intent 
rule violated section 11(d) of the Charter. In cases of general intent 
offences, he stated that “guilty intent is in effect presumed upon proof of 
the fact of intoxication. Moreover the presumption of guilt created by the 
                                                                                                             
70 Bernard, supra, note 56, at paras. 87 and 90-91. 
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Leary rule is irrebuttable.”71 In his view, that was a clear violation of 
both section 7 and section 11(d) since the presumed fact does not 
inevitably flow from the proven fact. Chief Justice Dickson’s analysis of 
why the general intent portion of the Leary rule is not saved by section 1 
of the Charter is particularly instructive and relevant to a Charter analysis 
of section 33.1 of the Criminal Code. It should be consulted by counsel 
and courts engaged in a constitutional challenge to section 33.1. 
In Daviault72 the constitutionality of the specific-general intent rule 
was revisited. The accused was a 69-year-old alcoholic man who 
sexually assaulted his 65-year-old partially disabled neighbour, after 
being invited to her apartment. He had consumed approximately eight 
beers before arriving and consumed approximately 35 ounces of brandy 
while there. He had no memory of the sexual assault (although lack of 
memory after the event does not necessarily mean he was unaware of 
what he was doing at the time of the event). An expert pharmacologist 
testified that with the quantity of alcohol in his system, a person could 
well be in a state of automatism or “black out”. The trial judge acquitted 
the accused. He applied Wilson J.’s reasons for judgment in Bernard and 
held that the accused was in a state of extreme intoxication and that there 
was a reasonable doubt whether he had the general intent to sexually 
assault the complainant while in that state. On appeal, the Quebec Court 
of Appeal held that Leary and George were still binding, that Wilson J.’s 
modification of Leary in Bernard was not the law, and therefore allowed 
the appeal and entered a conviction for sexual assault. 
In a 6-3 decision, the majority of the Supreme Court disagreed with 
the Court of Appeal, set aside the conviction entered by that Court, but 
did not re-enter the acquittal at trial. Instead, the majority ordered a new 
trial on the ground that the trial judge acquitted the accused using the 
ordinary standard of “reasonable doubt”, whereas the majority ruled that 
extreme intoxication akin to insanity or automatism is a defence to 
general intent offences only if the accused establishes that defence on a 
balance of probabilities. Thus a new trial was required to determine 
whether that reverse onus could be met by the accused on the facts of the 
case. Justice Sopinka dissenting (with Gonthier and Major JJ. concur-
ring) held that the Court of Appeal was right in deciding that the Leary 
rule applies and that drunkenness, regardless of its degree, cannot be 
used to negate general intent. In essence, Sopinka J. followed the 
                                                                                                             
71 Id., at para. 38. 
72 Supra, note 3. 
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reasoning of McIntyre J. in Bernard. He held that the Leary rule is not 
fundamentally illogical and he concluded, as McIntyre J. stated in 
Bernard, that “any logical weakness in this position is justified on the 
basis of sound social policy”.73 Second, relying on his own views in R. v. 
De Sousa74 and McLachlin J.’s views in R. v. Creighton,75 he held that 
symmetry between the actus reus and mens rea is a general rule for 
criminal liability, but is not a principle of fundamental justice since it is 
subject to several exceptions. He concluded that one of those exceptions 
is the general intent portion of the Leary rule. In his view, the Leary rule 
does not violate principles of fundamental justice because the extremely 
intoxicated accused who is convicted of a general intent offence is not 
morally innocent. The accused’s moral fault in voluntarily putting 
himself in that dangerous state is in his view sufficiently blameworthy to 
substitute as the mens rea for the offence committed. Furthermore, he 
held that this type of substitution is not disproportionate to the mens rea 
for the offence committed, and therefore is not a violation of the princi-
ples of fundamental justice. 
Justice Cory, for the majority, adopted the compromise approach of 
Wilson J. in Bernard. He first discussed the two contrasting common law 
approaches to the defence of voluntary intoxication. The first is to 
maintain the traditional specific-general intent rule as supported in Leary 
and Majewski, and the second is to abandon that distinction as was done 
in O’Connor, Kamipeli and as advocated by Dickson J., dissenting in 
Leary and Bernard. But with the advent of the Charter, Cory J. concluded 
that a third way suggested by Wilson J. in Bernard was possible, desir-
able and indeed required by the Charter. Justice Cory adopted Wilson J.’s 
view76 that the Leary rule is consistent with the Charter if it is modified 
by adding the “extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity” 
provision. Justice Cory then gave a fairly detailed explanation of how the 
general intent portion of the Leary rule offends sections 7 and 11(d). In 
short, to eliminate the requirement for proof of the requisite mens rea for 
the offence charged and to substitute in its place an entirely different 
form of fault — voluntarily getting extremely intoxicated — violates 
principles of fundamental justice in both section 7 and section 11(d) of 
the Charter. Justice Cory then gave the following brief explanation of 
                                                                                                             
73 Bernard, supra, note 56, at 878. 
74 [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (S.C.C.). 
75 [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Creighton”]. 
76 Quoted supra, note 70, at para. 90. 
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why the section 7 and section 11(d) infringements in the Leary rule could 
not be saved under section 1 of the Charter: 
In summary, I am of the view that to deny that even a very minimal 
mental element is required for sexual assault offends the Charter in a 
manner that is so drastic and so contrary to the principles of 
fundamental justice that it cannot be justified under section 1 of the 
Charter. The experience of other jurisdictions which have completely 
abandoned the Leary rule, coupled with the fact that under the proposed 
approach, the defence would be available only in the rarest of cases, 
demonstrate that there is no urgent policy or pressing objective which 
needs to be addressed. Studies on the relationship between intoxication 
and crime do not establish any rational link. Finally, as the Leary rule 
applies to all crimes of general intent, it cannot be said to be well 
tailored to address a particular objective and it would not meet either 
the proportionality or the minimum impairment requirements.77 
It is worth noting that Dickson J.’s section 1 analysis in Bernard is 
significantly more detailed than Cory J.’s explanation in Daviault. In 
addition, Cory J. went a step beyond the views of Wilson J. in Bernard in 
one important respect. In a brief, summary fashion, he equated the new 
extreme intoxication defence to the defence of insanity and concluded 
that, like the insanity defence, the onus of proof should be on the accused 
to establish Daviault extreme intoxication on a balance of probabilities. I 
will return to this cryptic conclusion later. 
4. The Enactment of Section 33.1 
The decision in Daviault was rendered on September 30, 1994. It 
was met with strong, adverse reaction from many quarters, including 
strong interventions from feminist legal scholars.78 The Minister of 
Justice and his officials scurried to find a solution. As usual, there was 
plenty of “behind the scenes” lobbying. Section 33.1 was introduced as 
Bill C-72 on February 23, 1995 and proceeded through Parliament fairly 
                                                                                                             
77 Daviault, supra, note 3, at para. 47. 
78 See, e.g., some of the public reaction which is cited by D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal 
Law: A Treatise, 6th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2011), at 469-70 [hereinafter “Stuart”] and I. 
Grant, “Second Chances: Bill C-72 and the Charter” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 379, at 383 n. 12 
[hereinafter “Grant”]. See also E. Sheehy, “A Brief on Bill C-72: An Act to Amend the Criminal 
Code” (NAWL, 2005) cited in Grant, id., at 394 n. 49; C. Boyle, Issue No. 97 Minutes of Proceed-
ings and Evidence, House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs in respect 
to Bill C-72 (April 5, 1995); E. Sheeby, “Intoxication Defence in Canada: Why Women Should 
Care” (1996) 23 Contemporary Drug Problems 595. 
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swiftly.79 It received Royal Assent on July 13, 1995 and came into force 
on September 15, 1995. Section 33.1 did not replace the common law 
defence of intoxication with a complete codified provision. Instead the 
Minister of Justice chose to craft Bill C-72 so that it only modified part 
of the Daviault rule. In turn, the Daviault rule upheld the common law 
Leary rule with one significant alteration. Thus, the law of voluntary 
intoxication as a defence in Canada is now the Leary rule, as modified by 
Daviault and as further amended by section 33.1. 
Section 33.1 provides, in essence, that if a person voluntarily gets 
into “a state of self-induced intoxication that renders the person unaware 
of, or incapable of consciously controlling, their behaviour”, then that 
person has departed “markedly from the standard of reasonable care 
generally recognized in Canadian society and is thereby criminally at 
fault” for any general intent offence “that includes as an element assault 
or any other interference or threat of interference ... with the bodily 
integrity of another person”. Put another way, such a person is acting in a 
penally negligent fashion. If the person in that penally negligent, intoxi-
cated state commits a general intent offence which involves assault, or 
interference or threat of interference with the bodily integrity of another 
person, the person is guilty of the offence committed even though he or 
she lacked the general intent or voluntariness normally required for that 
offence. In other words, the penal negligence in regard to getting volun-
tarily intoxicated becomes a substitute mens rea for the mens rea or 
voluntariness normally required for the general intent, assault-based 
offence that is committed. 
One obvious problem with section 33.1 is that it seems to reverse 
part of the Charter ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in Daviault. 
Not all of it, but part of it. Daviault intoxication (i.e., extreme intoxica-
tion) is still a valid defence to general intent offences not involving 
assault or interference or threatened interference with another person’s 
bodily integrity. Thus Daviault intoxication still applies to general intent 
offences, such as some instances of forcible entry (section 72),80 trespass-
ing at night (section 177), mischief (section 430), etc. 
                                                                                                             
79 Bill C-72 was passed through the House of Commons, including a review of it by the 
House of Commons Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, by June 22, 1995, and by July 12, 1995 
it had passed through the Senate, including a briefer review of it by the Senate Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs. No changes were made to the Bill throughout the Parliamentary process, 
except to delete the phrase “basic intent” (which is used in England and some other countries) and 
insert in its place the phrase “general intent”. 
80 R. v. Watt, [1995] A.J. No. 455, 39 C.R. (4th) 263 (Alta. Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div.)). 
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5. Constitutional Problems with the Law of Voluntary Intoxication 
There are three constitutional problems with the current law of vol-
untary intoxication which I intend to address: (1) the possible unconstitu-
tionality of section 33.1; (2) the reverse-onus imposed in the Daviault 
rule; and (3) the gap in the Daivault rule whereby a mistake of fact that 
negates a general intent is not recognized as a defence if the mistake is 
caused by intoxication that is less than extreme intoxication akin to 
automatism or insanity. 
(a) Constitutionality of Section 33.1 
In Daviault, the Supreme Court held that the portion of the Leary 
rule that prevents extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity 
from being a defence for a general intent offence is an infringement of 
principles of fundamental justice in both section 7 and section 11(d) of 
the Charter. The infringement in the Leary rule arises from the fact that 
the fault of getting extremely intoxicated is treated as an adequate and 
essentially equal level of fault as the fault required for the offence 
committed, e.g., an intent to commit sexual assault. In Daviault, the 
Supreme Court held that those two fault levels are not equivalent and 
cannot be substituted one for the other. The Supreme Court further 
concluded that this infringement of sections 7 and 11(d) cannot be saved 
under section 1 of the Charter. Thus Daviault held that extreme intoxica-
tion akin to automatism or insanity must be recognized as a defence — 
the Charter compels it! 
Parliament’s enactment of section 33.1 appears to be an “in your 
face” partial reversal of the Daviault ruling. Section 33.1 contradicts 
Daviault by declaring that extreme intoxication akin to automatism or 
insanity shall not be a defence to any general intent offence which 
includes as an element assault or interference with the bodily integrity of 
another. Thus, contrary to Daviault, section 33.1 states that extreme 
intoxication is not a defence to offences of assault or sexual assault. 
How did Parliament assume section 33.1, which is a partial reversal 
of Daviault, would survive a subsequent Charter challenge? First, section 
33.1 was drafted in a fashion to try to avoid the Charter obstacle identi-
fied in Daviault.81 To repeat, that obstacle was the Court’s finding that 
                                                                                                             
81 See, for example, Justice Minister Rock’s testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings of the Senate, Issue No. 46, June 28, 1995, at 46:22 
and 46:25. 
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substituting the fault of voluntary extreme intoxication for the general 
intent of the offence charged violates principles of fundamental justice in 
sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. In my view, Parliament’s attempt to 
avoid unconstitutional substitution of mens rea in section 33.1 has failed. 
Section 33.1 declares that voluntary, extreme intoxication resulting in the 
commission of a general intent offence involving assault or interference 
with a person’s bodily integrity constitutes the criminal fault level of 
penal negligence.82 While Parliament has the constitutional power to 
create a (non-stigma) offence of sexual assault by penal negligence, it did 
not do so. Section 33.1 still convicts the intoxicated accused of the 
intentional offence of sexual assault when that person lacked the neces-
sary general intent, and it justifies doing so by substituting instead the 
fault level of penal negligence in regard to getting extremely intoxicated. 
Penal negligence is not equivalent to intention and to substitute it in a 
crime that is defined as requiring intention will continue to violate 
sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. This point is relevant to my proposal 
later in this paper to create a separate set of penal negligence offences 
which run parallel to general and specific intent offences, and which can 
be used as an alternative lesser included offence if a person is so intoxi-
cated that he or she does not have the requisite intent or voluntariness for 
the subjective mens rea offence. 
Parliament has sometimes created parallel offences whereby one of-
fence is an intentional (or reckless) offence and the other is a criminal or 
penal negligence offence; consider, for example, assault causing bodily 
                                                                                                             
Bill C-72 is not meant to reverse the court’s decision in Daviault, but rather to address 
the problems or limitations with the common law that were identified by the court in that 
case. 
... 
In the Daviault case, the court found that troublesome because they were unable to find a 
linkage between the blame or the conduct of ingesting the intoxicant and the gist of the 
criminal act. 
What we have done to bridge the gap and overcome that legal issue is to legislate a stan-
dard of care and conduct to say that anybody who puts themselves in that position falls 
below that standard and is not able to rely upon that defence. 
82 Conduct that is a marked departure from the standard of care expected of reasonable 
persons has been classified as penal negligence by the Supreme Court: R. v. Hundal, [1993] S.C.J. 
No. 29, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867 (S.C.C.); R. v. Finlay, [1993] S.C.J. No. 89, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 103 
(S.C.C.); Creighton, supra, note 75, R. v. Gosset, [1993] S.C.J. No. 88, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Gosset”]; and R. v. Beatty, [2008] S.C.J. No. 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49 (S.C.C.). Criminal 
negligence is a higher form of negligence than penal negligence and it applies to three Criminal 
Code offences: ss. 220, 221 and 222(5)(b). It is defined in s. 219 as conduct showing “wanton or 
reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons” which, according to the above case law, 
also involves “a marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonable person”: see also 
R. v. Tutton, [1989] S.C.J. No. 60, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392 (S.C.C.). 
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harm (section 267(b)) and criminal negligence causing bodily harm 
(section 221), or intentional or reckless arson (section 433) and arson by 
penal negligence (section 436). By creating separate parallel negligence 
offences for persons who lack subjective mens rea due to intoxication, 
the improper fault substitution of negligence for intention in section 33.1 
is avoided. Another principle of fundamental justice should also be noted 
here. In Martineau83 and in Creighton,84 the Supreme Court stated that 
causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing 
harm unintentionally. This fundamental principle of proportionate 
punishment can be satisfied provided the two offences do not have the 
same mandatory minimum punishment.85 This leaves Parliament open to 
create the same maximum penalty for the penally negligent offence as for 
the intentional offence, just as Parliament has done in sections 267(b) 
and 221, or to create different maximum punishments as Parliament has 
done in sections 433 and 436. 
Apart from Parliament’s attempt to avoid a Charter breach in respect 
to substituted mens rea, Parliament’s main Charter defence to its abroga-
tion of part of the Daviault defence in section 33.1 is a claim that even if 
section 33.1 involves an unconstitutional form of substituted fault, that 
violation of sections 7 and 11(d) is justified under section 1 of the 
Charter. Parliament tried to embolden its section 1 justification by 
emphasizing the government’s pressing and substantial objective in 
enacting section 33.1, and by attempting to impair the section 7 and 
section 11(d) Charter infringement as little as reasonably possible by 
restricting section 33.1 to general intent offences involving assault or 
interference with bodily integrity. In regard to its pressing and substantial 
legislative objective, Bill C-72 contains a long Preamble which expressly 
sets out Parliament’s concerns about permitting a defence of extreme 
intoxication to persons who commit assault-type offences. In particular, 
those concerns relate to the strong association between intoxication and 
violence, and the infringement of equality values that such a defence 
involves, since the victims of this form of drunken violence are dispro-
portionately women and children.86 These claims are real and legitimate 
but may not be enough to overcome a section 1 Charter challenge. 
Certainly, the government was not entirely confident that section 33.1 
                                                                                                             
83 Supra, note 11. 
84 Supra, note 75. 
85 See Creighton, id., and Gosset, supra, note 82, as discussed in Stuart, supra, note 78, at 
224-25. 
86 See note 26, supra, and Grant, supra, note 78, at 388-90. 
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would survive a constitutional challenge. In introducing Bill C-72 into 
the House of Commons and in defending it in the Senate, the Minister of 
Justice indicated that the government was seriously considering a 
reference of Bill C-72 to the Supreme Court before it was proclaimed.87 
That reference did not occur. It is, however, very surprising that 17 years 
after its enactment, no appellate court in Canada has yet ruled on the 
constitutionality of section 33.1, although appellate courts have, from 
time to time, applied section 33.1 without commenting on its constitu-
tional validity.88 
On the other hand, courts of first instance have considered the consti-
tutionality of section 33.1 on several occasions and have reached 
different conclusions. There is virtual unanimity among those courts that 
section 33.1 does violate principles of fundamental justice in sections 7 
and 11(d), as articulated in Daviault. These cases have generally ignored 
one strong feminist argument. That argument is that the removal of a 
defence of extreme intoxication in cases of general intent offences 
involving assault (by reliance on the device of substituted fault) should 
not be seen as a violation of principles of fundamental justice since it 
supports equality rights of women and children and is applied to a group 
of extremely intoxicated persons who are not morally blameless for the 
ultimate consequences of their conduct. This argument is, for example, 
well articulated by Professor Grant.89 If the Supreme Court adopts this 
legitimate approach (and I cautiously predict that it will not), section 
33.1 may survive a section 7 challenge. The Court will then be required 
to apply this same reasoning to conclude that the substituted fault in 
section 33.1 does not violate section 11(d) of the Charter. If that is the 
case, then the courts will not have to apply a section 1 Charter analysis to 
section 33.1 of the Criminal Code. 
In regard to lower courts that have examined the constitutionality of 
section 33.1, the different conclusions reached by those courts arise from 
their difference of opinion as to whether section 33.1 is a reasonable limit 
on the violation of sections 7 and 11(d). In R. v. Vickberg,90 R. v. Dow91 
and R. v. N. (S.),92 the courts engaged in detailed analysis before conclud-
ing that section 33.1 did not violate section 1 of the Charter. On the other 
                                                                                                             
87 See Proceedings of the Senate, supra, note 81, at 46:23. 
88 See, e.g., R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, [2011] S.C.J. No. 58, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 575 (S.C.C.). 
89 Grant, supra, note 78, at 390-400. 
90 [1998] B.C.J. No. 1034, 16 C.R. (5th) 164 (B.C.S.C.). 
91 [2010] Q.J. No. 8999, 261 C.C.C. (3d) 399 (Que. S.C.). 
92 [2012] Nu.J. No. 3, 2012 NUCJ 2 (Nu. C.J.). 
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hand, in R. v. Brenton,93 R. v. Dunn,94 R. v. Jenson,95 R. v. Cedano96 and 
R. v. Fleming,97 the courts held that section 33.1 did violate section 1 of 
the Charter. In regard to that conclusion, the reasons for judgment in 
Brenton, Dunn and Jenson are most helpful. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to conduct a detailed critique of these two lines of reasoning. What 
can be said is that it remains an open question as to whether the Supreme 
Court will uphold or strike down section 33.1. 
In my opinion, if the Supreme Court accepts the view that there is 
another reasonable alternative open to Parliament to achieve its objec-
tives of denunciation of the offender’s conduct and protection of society, 
especially women and children, from drunken violence, without any 
impairment of section 7 or section 11(d), then section 33.1 is bound to 
fail the minimal impairment test in section 1 of the Charter. Later in this 
paper, I argue that Parliament’s objectives can indeed be achieved with 
no constitutional infringement by creating a set of penally negligent 
offences which apply when an accused’s voluntary intoxication negates 
the requisite subjective fault for those offences. 
(b) The Reverse Onus for Daviault Intoxication 
When Wilson J. fashioned the defence of extreme intoxication akin 
to automatism or insanity for general intent offences in Bernard, she also 
applied the ordinary standard of proof to that defence. In other words, the 
Crown must prove the requisite intent, whether specific or general, 
beyond a reasonable doubt. If a reasonable doubt exists, intent has not 
been proven. Intent is normally proven by drawing inferences from all of 
the evidence. If there is evidence of voluntary intoxication that raises a 
reasonable doubt regarding whether the accused formed the minimal 
intent required for general intent offences, then, as Wilson J. indicated, 
the accused must be acquitted.98 Likewise, Dickson C.J.C., who dis-
sented in Bernard, clearly recognized that the onus and standard of proof 
                                                                                                             
93 [1999] N.W.T.J. No. 113, 28 C.R. (5th) 308 (N.W.T.S.C.), revd on other grounds [2001] 
N.W.T.J. No. 14, 2001 NWTCA 1 (N.W.T.C.A.) [hereinafter “Brenton”]. 
94 [1999] O.J. No. 5452, 28 C.R. (5th) 295 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Dunn”]. See also K. 
Smith, “Section 33.1: Denial of Daviault Defence Should Be Held Constitutional” (2000) 28 C.R. 
(5th) 350. 
95 [2000] O.J. No. 4870 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Jenson”]. The issue was not argued on 
appeal: [2005] O.J. No. 1052, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (Ont. C.A.). 
96 [2005] O.J. No. 1174, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 468 (Ont. C.J.). 
97 [2010] O.J. No. 5987, 2010 ONSC 5169 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
98 Bernard, supra, note 56, at paras. 90-91. 
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in intoxication defence cases remains on the Crown. In doing so, he 
pointed out that mens rea is a fundamental requirement of criminal 
liability and that it is always for the Crown to prove mens rea beyond a 
reasonable doubt. He further noted that since intoxication affects one’s 
ability to perceive the circumstances or appreciate the consequences of 
one’s act, “therefore intoxication is relevant to the mental element in 
crime, and should be considered, together with all other evidence, in 
determining whether the Crown has proved the requisite mental state 
beyond a reasonable doubt”.99 
As already noted, in Daviault Cory J. for the majority of the Court 
adopted Wilson J.’s expansion of the Leary rule to cover extreme 
intoxication in the context of general intent offences. But with very little 
analysis, Cory J. also stated that, like insanity, the burden of proof should 
be on the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that extreme 
intoxication akin to automatism or insanity existed. In that regard, Cory 
J. stated: 
It should not be forgotten that if the flexible “Wilson” approach is 
taken, the defence will only be put forward in those rare circumstances 
of extreme intoxication. Since that state must be shown to be akin to 
automatism or insanity, I would suggest that the accused should be 
called upon to establish it on the balance of probabilities. This court has 
recognized in R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303, that although it 
constituted a violation of the accused’s rights under s. 11(d) of the 
Charter, such a burden could be justified under s. 1. In this case, I feel 
that the burden can be justified. Drunkenness of the extreme degree 
required in order for it to become relevant will only occur on rare 
occasions. It is only the accused who can give evidence as to the 
amount of alcohol consumed and its effect upon him. Expert evidence 
would be required to confirm that the accused was probably in a state 
akin to automatism or insanity as a result of drinking. ... 
Extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity should, like 
insanity, be established by the accused on a balance of probabilities.100 
The reverse onus imposed in Daviault was not altered by section 
33.1. That reverse onus continues to apply to general intent offences not 
involving assault as an element. That reverse onus should be re-
challenged when the next intoxication case reaches the Supreme Court. 
There are a number of grounds to challenge it. First, Cory J. acknowl-
                                                                                                             
99 Dickson C.J.C., id., at para. 16. 
100 Daviault, supra, note 3, at paras. 63-64. 
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edges that the reverse onus violates section 11(d) of the Charter, but he 
expresses the view that the violation can be justified under section 1 of 
the Charter. However, he does not engage in a complete or detailed 
section 1 analysis. Instead, he simply equates the extreme intoxication 
defence to the insanity defence and then applies Chaulk101 as authority 
for the constitutional legitimacy of the reverse onus. But insanity and 
extreme intoxication are not virtually identical. Intoxication is a defence 
because it negates mens rea. And mens rea is an element of liability 
which the Crown must always prove beyond a reasonable doubt. On the 
other hand, insanity may negate mens rea, but it is much wider than a 
mens rea defence; it applies even if mens rea exists provided the criteria 
in section 16 of the Criminal Code have been proven. 
Second, the reverse onus in section 16 which deals with the mental 
disorder defence is a historic anomaly dating back to M’Naghten’s 
Case102 in 1843, a time when the burden of proof for affirmative defences 
was less clear. In subsequent cases, including Woolmington v. D.P.P.,103 
the burden of disproving affirmative defences, once there was an air of 
reality to them, was clearly placed on the Crown beyond a reasonable 
doubt. It is unfortunate that Canadian codifiers in 1892 incorporated the 
reverse onus for the insanity defence into section 16 of the Criminal 
Code. While one can at least say that the reverse onus in the insanity 
defence is legislatively imposed, it is very disappointing to see the 
Supreme Court, on its own initiative, judicially impose a reverse onus 
where there is no need to do so.104 Third, there seems to be no convincing 
rationale or justification to place the ordinary burden of proof on the 
Crown in regard to the intoxication defence for specific intent offences 
and to place it on the accused for general intent offences. That is illogical 
and arbitrary, and is certainly difficult to explain to jurors in cases where 
there is evidence of intoxication negating both specific and general 
intent. 
                                                                                                             
101 Supra, note 5. 
102 (1843), 8 E.R. 718 (H.L.). 
103 [1935] A.C. 462 (H.L.). The House of Lords treated the reverse onus in the insanity 
defence as some sort of historic exception. 
104 The Supreme Court compounded its uncritical acceptance of a reverse onus in Daviault 
by then justifying a reverse onus for the defence of automatism in R. v. Stone, [1999] S.C.J. No. 27, 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 (S.C.C.), through the use of a bootstrap argument. The majority in Stone stated 
that since the onus for the defences of insanity and Daviault intoxication are on the accused, then it 
is logical and appropriate to place the burden of proof on the accused for the somewhat similar 
defence of automatism. 
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Fourth, a full section 1 analysis of whether the reverse onus for ex-
treme intoxication is justified would easily put paid to the assumption 
that it would be virtually impossible for the Crown to disprove extreme 
intoxication without a reverse onus. That questionable assumption was 
accepted in regard to the insanity defence by a majority of the Supreme 
Court in Chaulk105 in the absence of any empirical evidence supporting 
that assumption. On the other hand, Wilson J. relied on empirical 
evidence in rejecting that assumption. My own brief empirical study, 
which demonstrates that the prosecution can easily disprove the insanity 
defence in states in the United States where the prosecution bears the 
burden to do so, also supports Wilson J.’s conclusion on this point.106 
Moreover, even if the assumption was true that mental disorder is such a 
complex, uncertain state of mind that it would be virtually impossible for 
the Crown to disprove it, that assumption has little or no purchase in 
respect to the Crown’s ability to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused was not so extremely intoxicated that he lacked the general 
intent for the offence charged. If the accused wants to raise an air of 
reality to the defence of intoxication, evidence of how much the accused 
drank or consumed will have to come from the accused. The credibility 
of that evidence can easily be assessed against the actions of the accused, 
statements by the accused and the observations of others. In addition, in 
an effort to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of extreme 
intoxication, it is likely that the accused will call expert evidence in 
regard to the effects of a certain amount of alcohol or drugs on a person’s 
mental functions. Proof or disproof of extreme intoxication negating 
general intent is no more difficult than proof or disproof of intoxication 
negating specific intent, which the Crown must already do. There is 
                                                                                                             
105 [1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 (S.C.C.). 
106 See G. Ferguson, “A Critique of Proposals to Reform the Insanity Defence” (1989) 14 
Queen’s L.J. 135, at 148: 
The experience in the United States is particularly revealing. As of 1982, in half of the 
States and in all federal courts, once there is some evidence of insanity, the prosecution 
has the burden of proving the accused’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Does that 
burden allow a throng of fabricated insanity pleas to succeed? Does it put an intolerable 
or impossible burden on the Crown? I sampled the reported cases in those jurisdictions 
for the year 1982. In almost all of the cases there was at least some expert evidence sup-
porting the accused’s insanity plea. But in twenty-eight of the thirty cases, the defence of 
insanity failed. The Crown proved its case; the accused failed to raise a reasonable doubt. 
If anything, these figures suggest that even raising a reasonable doubt about insanity may 
be too difficult a standard to meet rather than one which is too facile. (Incidentally, in 
jurisdictions where the accused had the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities, the 
accused’s insanity plea failed sixteen times in seventeen cases.) 
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simply no need for justification to reverse the onus of proof for extreme 
intoxication. 
(c) The Mistake of Fact Gap in Daviault and Section 33.1 
Both Daviault, and its restricted version in section 33.1, still allow a 
person to be convicted of a general intent offence when that person 
makes a mistake of fact that negates the general intent, if that mistake 
was caused by a degree of intoxication that was less than the extreme 
intoxication required under Daviault. Under Daviault, intoxication is 
only a defence for general intent offences when the intoxication is 
extreme. Otherwise intoxication is not admissible to negate general 
intent.107 For example, causing a disturbance by shouting in a public 
place is a general intent offence. An intoxicated person, who is not 
extremely intoxicated, may intend to talk loudly, but due to his intoxica-
tion does not realize that he is shouting. But because his intoxication is 
not extreme, the accused cannot rely on intoxication as a defence even 
though the accused lacks the general intent to cause a disturbance. 
Likewise, mischief (section 430) is a general intent offence.108 If an 
accused intentionally kicks the side of a car, causing some damage, but 
due to intoxication he mistakenly thinks the car is his own, he does not 
have the mens rea for mischief. However he will be convicted because he 
is not permitted to rely on mistake of fact caused by intoxication that is 
less than extreme. The same would apply to a person charged with 
assaulting a police officer, which is a general intent offence.109 If an 
accused intended to assault a person, but by mistake of fact did not know 
the person was a police officer, then the accused is acquitted of assault-
ing a police officer and convicted of a common assault.110 But if the 
accused’s mistake is caused by intoxication that is less than extreme 
intoxication, then intoxication is no defence and the accused will be 
convicted of assaulting a police officer. And since the enactment of 
section 33.1, the accused would also be convicted even if his intoxication 
was so extreme that he did not have the general intent to assault anyone. 
                                                                                                             
107 See, e.g., R. v. Moreau, [1986] O.J. No. 259, 26 C.C.C. (3d) 359 (Ont. C.A.). 
108 R. v. Schmidtke, [1985] O.J. No. 84, 19 C.C.C. (3d) 390 (Ont. C.A.). 
109 R. v. Tom, [1992] B.C.J. No. 2618, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 84 (B.C.C.A.) and Majewski, supra, 
note 42; contra R. v. Vlcko, [1972] O.J. No. 905, 10 C.C.C. (2d) 139 (Ont. C.A.). The exclusion of 
mistake of fact arising from self-induced intoxication in s. 273.2(a)(i) relates only to mistakes 
concerning consent in respect to sexual offences in ss. 271-273. 
110 R. v. McLeod, [1954] B.C.J. No. 104, 20 C.R. 281 (B.C.C.A.). 
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Chief Justice Dickson recognized this gap and anomaly in his dis-
senting judgment in Bernard. He argued that if a mistake of fact negates 
the requisite subjective mens rea for an offence, whether that mens rea is 
specific or general, an accused should not be convicted of that offence, 
whether the mistake arose from intoxication or otherwise. The existence 
of this gap in the intoxication defence has been largely ignored since 
Dickson J.’s comments in Bernard. The continuation of this gap in the 
current law of intoxication appears to violate principles of fundamental 
justice under sections 7 and 11(d), and does not appear justified under 
section 1 of the Charter. It should be challenged. This gap will disappear 
under my proposal. 
6. Intoxication and Subjective Elements of Defences 
There is disagreement and uncertainty in many jurisdictions on the 
question of whether an accused is entitled to rely on certain defences if, 
due to voluntary intoxication, that person has a mistaken belief in regard 
to an essential element of that defence.111 The disagreement and contro-
versy should only arise in respect to defences which contain some 
subjective fault elements. Where the essential elements of a defence are 
defined on a purely objective, reasonable person standard, there is no 
question that the accused’s self-induced intoxication should not be 
relevant in determining whether those objective, reasonable standards 
have been met. A reasonable person is a sober person. While intoxica-
tion, by itself, is not an absolute bar to an accused relying on a defence 
such as self-defence, the intoxicated accused must nonetheless meet the 
objective standards required for that defence in spite of his or her 
intoxication. The issue of the relevance of intoxication in regard to 
defences has most frequently arisen in the context of self-defence, but the 
same issue can also arise with other defences such as provocation, duress 
and necessity. The analysis of a mistake of fact caused by voluntary 
intoxication with respect to an essential element of a defence needs to be 
analyzed in a slightly different way than mistake of fact caused by 
voluntary intoxication which negates the mens rea of an offence. 
For defences like self-defence, the key question is whether the law in 
the jurisdiction in question is defined solely in terms of objective 
elements, or whether the defence contains a combination of subjective 
and objective elements. For example, the key elements of self-defence in 
                                                                                                             
111 See, e.g., the discussion in Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17, at 104-112. 
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section 34(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code are defined in both subjec-
tive and objective terms. Thus the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Reilly112 held that intoxication is not relevant in determining whether the 
accused (i.e., a subjective test) had a “reasonable” (i.e., an objective test) 
apprehension of death or bodily harm and whether the accused “reasona-
bly” believed he could not otherwise preserve himself from death or 
bodily harm. On the other hand, New Zealand and some Australian 
jurisdictions (including the Commonwealth, ACT, Tasmania and New 
South Wales) have a different combination of objective and subjective 
self-defence elements (i.e., “reasonable force or response in the circum-
stances as he or she perceives them”).113 Courts in New Zealand114 and 
New South Wales115 have held that intoxication can be taken into account 
when determining the accused’s perception of the circumstances in 
regard to the need for self-defence. The accused’s perception of the 
circumstances is relevant to both the perceived, but mistaken need for 
self-defence and to the degree of force that is reasonable (an objective 
test) under the accused’s mistaken perception of the circumstances (a 
subjective test). For example, if an accused, due to intoxication, wrongly 
thinks he is being unlawfully assaulted by another person with a gun, the 
accused’s claim of self-defence would be judged upon his mistaken 
perception of the facts in regard to both the need for self-defence and the 
type of response that would be warranted if the mistaken facts actually 
existed. The Tasmania Law Reform Institute in its 2006 Report supports 
this latter approach, and recommends that intoxication should be relevant 
to determining whether subjective, or partially subjective, elements of a 
defence exist.116 I agree with this approach, subject to an important 
corollary principle. Jurisdictions such as New Zealand and New South 
Wales seem to treat intoxication as to subjective elements of a defence as 
a full defence entitling the accused to an acquittal. That position ignores 
the fact that the accused has caused a serious harm due to self-induced 
intoxication and is deserving of condemnation and some degree of 
                                                                                                             
112 [1984] S.C.J. No. 46, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.). This also appears to have been the 
view of Cox C.J. in Weiderman (Attorney General’s Reference No. 1, 1996) (1998), 7 Tas. R. 293 
(C.A.). 
113 Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17, at 104-110. 
114 R. v. Thomas, [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 141. 
115 R. v. Katarzynski, [2002] N.S.W.S.C. 613. 
116 Indeed, Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17 goes one step further and re-
commends that intoxication should also be relevant in assessing the accused’s physical abilities (e.g., 
slow reactions, poor coordination) and therefore the increased degree of force that might be 
necessary to defend oneself while intoxicated. 
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punishment in the same way that the intoxicated offender who lacks the 
requisite subjective intent for an offence is deserving of punishment. 
Thus, I recommend that an accused who is acquitted of the offence 
charged on the basis of a defence which is only applicable due to the 
accused’s self-induced intoxication should be convicted of the new 
penally negligent, intoxication-based offence described below. 
7. An Alternative Offence for Intoxicated Offenders 
In my view the best and most principled way to deal with voluntary 
intoxication is to create a set of rules which (1) allow evidence of 
voluntary intoxication to negate the subjective fault elements and the 
voluntariness requirement of offences and defences; (2) permit convic-
tion of persons who are acquitted of an offence by reason of voluntary 
intoxication to be convicted of an included offence; (3) create a new 
included offence which will be an unintentional form of the full offence 
and will be called “unintentional [e.g., sexual assault, aggravated assault, 
theft, etc.] due to criminal intoxication”; (4) the voluntariness require-
ment for this new penal negligence offence will be satisfied by the 
accused’s prior voluntary conduct of becoming so intoxicated that he or 
she ran the risk of committing an offence while intoxicated; and (5) make 
the new unintentional offence due to intoxication punishable by the same 
or a specified portion (e.g., 80 to 90 per cent) of the maximum punish-
ment that exists for the full offence. The general parameters of the new 
voluntary intoxication provisions would be as follows: 
Voluntary Intoxication 
(1) Voluntary intoxication shall not constitute a defence to any 
criminal charge unless the conduct constituting the offence was 
committed without the subjective fault element or voluntariness 
required for that offence due to that intoxication. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person departs markedly from 
the standard of reasonable care generally recognized in Canadian 
society and is thereby criminally at fault where the person commits the 
conduct constituting an offence while in a state of self-induced 
intoxication that negates the requisite subjective fault or voluntariness 
for that offence. 
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(3) Where the conduct constituting a criminal offence was done 
without the subjective fault element or voluntariness required for that 
offence due to voluntary intoxication, the accused shall be acquitted of 
that offence and convicted of an included offence of unintentionally 
causing that offence due to criminal intoxication.117 If the offence 
charged is indictable, the included offence shall be deemed indictable; 
if the offence charged is summary, the included offence shall be 
deemed summary. 
(4) The punishment for the offence of unintentionally causing an 
offence due to criminal intoxication in subsection (3) shall 
[insert option (a) or (b)] 
(a) not exceed the maximum punishment for the offence that would 
have been committed but for the intoxication. 
(b) (i) not exceed 15 [or some other nominated number] years 
where the offence he or she would have been convicted 
of but for the intoxication is punishable by life 
imprisonment, or 
(ii) in all other cases, not exceed more than [80 or 90 per 
cent, etc.] of the maximum punishment for the offence 
that he or she would have been convicted of but for the 
intoxication. 
(5) Voluntary intoxication is not relevant in determining whether an 
accused has met objectively defined elements of a defence. However, 
where any element of a defence is based on a subjective belief or 
knowledge of a fact, an accused may rely upon his or her belief of that 
fact even though that belief is mistaken due to voluntary intoxication. 
(6) Where an accused meets the requirements of a defence based on 
a mistaken belief, caused by voluntary intoxication, in respect to an 
essential subjective element of that defence, the accused shall be 
acquitted of the offence which he or she would have committed but for 
the intoxicated defence and shall be convicted of an included offence of 
                                                                                                             
117 If it was considered desirable or expedient, a provision could be added to create an excep-
tion for the included offence in cases in which the mens rea for murder is negated by voluntary 
intoxication. Under s. 86(3), the offence would be called “unintentional murder due to criminal 
intoxication”. It could instead be provided that the included offence would be manslaughter, as it 
currently is. 
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unintentionally causing that offence due to extreme intoxication, in 
accordance with subsection (3). 
There is not space in this paper to fully explain this proposal, but a 
few brief comments are in order. 
(1) Advantages. This proposal abolishes the troublesome distinction 
between specific and general intent and in the process also does away 
with the Daviault and section 33.1 exceptions to that rule. The new 
provision does not reverse the onus of proof and place it on the accused. 
And by creating a parallel set of penally negligent offences due to 
voluntary intoxication, there is no longer any concern about an unconsti-
tutional substitution of mens rea. 
(2) Differences from other proposals. Proposals for the creation of 
some form of alternate offence for offenders who lack mens rea due to 
voluntary intoxication have been considered in Canada and elsewhere.118 
The creation of an included offence of “criminal intoxication” is the 
proposal most frequently discussed. That proposal has been properly 
discarded by academics and by the government when it was considering 
its response to Daviault.119 That proposal has several flaws. First, it 
improperly disguises the actual harm caused by creating only one offence 
called criminal intoxication. A conviction for criminal intoxication may 
involve minor harm such as creating a disturbance or major harm such as 
aggravated sexual assault. Second, because the offence of criminal 
intoxication would cover such a wide range of harm, it is very difficult to 
establish a maximum penalty for that offence — 14 years would be 
grossly disproportionate for causing a disturbance and six months, or two 
years, would normally be grossly disproportionate for aggravated sexual 
assault. In addition, there are possible constitutional problems with 
respect to creating only one offence of criminal intoxication. My pro-
posal suffers from none of these three defects. It creates a set of intoxica-
tion offences which match the harm caused. Since the name of the 
offence matches the harm caused, there is no problem of inappropriate 
                                                                                                             
118 See, e.g., T. Quigley “Reform of the Intoxication Offence” (1987) 33 McGill L.J. 1; 
P. Healy, “Intoxication in the Codification of Canadian Criminal Law” (1994) 72 Can. Bar Rev. 515; 
and Grant, supra, note 78, at 383-85. 
119 See, e.g., the academics referred to in id. See also Senate Committee Proceedings on Bill 
C-72, supra, note 81, at 46:24 and 46:25; and Department of Justice, Information Note, “Self-
Induced Intoxication as Criminal Fault” released by the Department on February 24, 1995 when Bill 
C-72 was tabled in Parliament. A proposal to create an offence of dangerous intoxication was 
rejected in England. However, alternative offences built on criminal negligence have been enacted in 
South Australia, Northern Territory, South Africa and Germany. For more details on these proposals, 
see Ferguson, “Intoxication”, supra, note 15, at 276-79. 
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labelling. Second, in regard to the penalty for the new intoxicated 
offences, my proposal sets out two options for Parliament to choose 
from: (1) the same maximum penalty for the intoxicated offence as for 
the non-intoxicated offence; or (2) a reduced maximum sentence for the 
intoxicated offence (e.g., 80 or 90 per cent of the maximum sentence for 
the same offence committed by non-intoxicated persons). 
(3) Intoxication and sexual assault. If section 33.1 is held to be un-
constitutional and Parliament decides to enact the alternative approach to 
the intoxication defence set out in this paper, these new provisions will 
replace section 273.2(a)(i), which prohibits the defence of mistaken 
belief in consent due to self-induced intoxication. Under my proposal, 
mistaken belief in consent due to voluntary intoxication may be a 
defence to sexual assault in some circumstances, but where it is, the 
accused will be automatically convicted of the new included offence of 
unintentional sexual assault due to criminal intoxication. If Parliament 
chooses to keep the limitation in section 273.2(b) that mistaken belief in 
consent is a defence only where the accused has “taken reasonable steps 
in the circumstances as that person perceived them”, intoxicated mistakes 
will sometimes succeed and sometimes fail as a defence to sexual 
assault. Where the accused did not take reasonable steps in the circum-
stances as the accused mistakenly perceived them due to intoxication, the 
accused will be convicted of sexual assault; where the accused did take 
reasonable steps in light of the circumstances as he mistakenly perceived 
them due to his intoxication, the accused will be acquitted of sexual 
assault but convicted of the new offence of unintentional sexual assault 
due to criminal intoxication. If Parliament is not satisfied with that result 
— a result that I consider to be appropriate to those circumstances, then 
Parliament can amend section 273.2(b) by deleting the expression “in the 
circumstances known to the accused” and replacing it with the expres-
sion “in the circumstances as reasonably perceived by the accused”. The 
insertion of the word “reasonably” will make the element of consent a 
purely objective standard and thereby entirely eliminate the defence of 
mistaken belief in consent due to self-induced intoxication. 
(4) Penalty. I favour the reduced maximum penalty model noted 
above. The existing specific intent rule inherently recognizes that 
unintentionally committing an offence due to intoxication is somewhat 
less morally blameworthy than intentionally committing the same 
offence (pejoratively referred to as a “drunkenness discount”). At the 
time Bill C-72 was enacted, the government indicated they did not want 
to adopt a proposal (at least for general intent offences) which involved a 
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sentencing discount for intoxicated offenders.120 So my proposal leaves 
that option open for the government to choose. 
As I noted above under the heading “Constitutionality of Section 
33.1”, there is no constitutional problem with having the same maximum 
penalty for the included offence as for the full offence. Maximum 
penalties allow judges discretion to treat each case on its merits, includ-
ing whether the intoxication in that case is an aggravating, mitigating or 
neutral factor. There may be constitutional problems, however, if both 
offences carry the same mandatory minimum penalty. For offences that 
involve mandatory minimum sentences, the proper option is to declare 
that the included intoxication offence has a lesser mandatory minimum 
penalty than the full offence (e.g., 80 to 90 per cent). 
(5) Procedural issues. Because the new intoxicated offence is spe-
cifically referred to as an “included offence”, there is no need under 
section 662 of the Criminal Code to charge it separately. Juries will need 
to be instructed, especially, in cases of multiple defences that “if you 
have a reasonable doubt whether the accused had the requisite mental 
element for the offence charged due to voluntary intoxication, you must 
acquit him or her on that charge and you must convict him or her of the 
included offence of unintentional [sexual assault] due to criminal 
intoxication”. Concerns have been raised that creating a lesser included 
offence based on intoxication would encourage plea bargains whereby 
the accused pleads guilty to the lesser offence in circumstances where he 
or she should be convicted of the full offence. While this is a legitimate 
concern, the problem is not with the presence of an included intoxicated 
offence for proper cases, the problem is with unregulated or improper 
plea bargaining. If it becomes a problem, the solution is to better regulate 
that form of plea bargaining. 
(6) Name of offence. The name I have chosen for the intoxicated of-
fence is not written in stone. The name “unintentional [sexual assault] 
due to criminal intoxication” is in my view an accurate reflection of how 
the intoxication defence is operating. However, the name could be 
changed if Parliament thought another name was more appropriate. For 
example, the offence could be called “criminal intoxication causing 
[sexual assault]” or “[sexual assault] due to criminal intoxication”. 
                                                                                                             
120 Ironically, by only amending part of the Leary and Daviault intoxication rules, Parlia-
ment has left sentencing discounts in place for specific offences and for general intent offences that 
do not involve assault.  
